A Dual-Class Share Structure (also known as a 'dual-class stock structure') is a way companies issue different types of shares with unequal voting rights. Imagine a company with two types of common stock: Class A and Class B. The Class A shares, typically sold to the public, might come with one vote per share. Meanwhile, the Class B shares, usually held by founders, family members, or top executives, could carry 10, 20, or even more votes per share. This setup allows a small group of insiders to maintain control over the company's decisions—like electing the board of directors or approving a merger—even if they own a minority of the company's total equity. It effectively separates economic ownership from voting control, creating a powerful inner circle that steers the corporate ship, while public shareholders are more like passengers along for the ride.
Why would a company choose such a seemingly unfair structure? The primary motivation is to allow visionary founders to execute their long-term strategy without interference.
When a successful private company decides on going public, its founders face a dilemma. They need capital from the public markets to grow, but they fear losing control of the “big picture” to new shareholders who might be fixated on short-term profits. A dual-class structure acts as a fortress, protecting them from several perceived threats:
This structure has been famously used by founder-led tech giants like Alphabet Inc. (Google) and Meta Platforms (Facebook), as well as older family-controlled companies like Ford Motor Company. The argument is that you, the investor, are betting on the unique genius of the founder, and this structure lets them work their magic unhindered.
For a value investor, who prizes good stewardship and shareholder rights, the dual-class structure is often viewed with deep skepticism. It goes against a core tenet of sound corporate governance: the alignment of interests between owners and managers.
The principle of “one share, one vote” is a cornerstone of shareholder democracy. It ensures that voting power is directly proportional to the amount of capital at risk. When this link is broken, it can lead to problems:
The legendary investor Warren Buffett, a disciple of Benjamin Graham, has been a vocal critic of the trend, arguing that when seeking a manager for your capital, you want a partner, not a dictator. Interestingly, his own company, Berkshire Hathaway, has two classes of stock (A and B), but it was designed primarily to make the shares more accessible, with Class B shares having significantly less economic and voting power on a per-share basis, which is a different dynamic.
A dual-class structure isn't an automatic deal-breaker, but it demands a much higher level of scrutiny. A value investor might consider it acceptable only under specific conditions:
A dual-class share structure represents a fundamental trade-off. In exchange for the potential of visionary, long-term leadership, you surrender your right to have a meaningful say in how the company is run. As an investor, you are explicitly trusting the controlling shareholders to act in your best interest without the usual checks and balances. Before investing in such a company, ask yourself: Is the leadership so exceptional that I'm willing to give them a blank check? And is there a clear plan for restoring shareholder democracy in the future? If the answer to either question is no, it's often wise to walk away.